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Introduction
Th e International Health Regulations (IHR[2005]) [1]
requirements parallel a number of biosurveillance 
programs’ core elements and represent a language that is 
acceptable to leadership around the world. Th ey focus on 
establishing processes and building national capacity for 
reporting of any event that could be perceived as a threat 
to global health security. Additional standards and/or 
guidance provided by the International Organization for 
Animal Health (OIE) and Th e United Nations’ Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) represent complemen-
tary frameworks to engage country leadership on the 
animal health and food security fronts. Furthermore, the 
tripartite strategic alignment published by FAO-OIE-
WHO in 2010 [2] and the One Health Initiative [3] oﬀ er 
additional directives to improve coordination at the 
animal, human and ecosystems interfaces and reiterate 
the commitment to coordinate global activities to address 
health risks. Th ese global mandates compel the strength-
ening of partner countries’ detection and response 
systems in a holistic and systematic manner.
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Enhancing disease surveillance systems requires the 
integration of multiple technical disciplines and stake-
holders in a structured and informed design process. Th e 
ﬁ nal design and set of interventions ought to diﬀ er based 
on the context and challenges existing locally, therefore 
requiring customizable and adaptable implementation 
strategies to ensure the feasibility and eﬀ ectiveness of the 
interventions. Because surveillance and preparedness 
require coordination and collaboration among various 
programs, ﬁ rst line providers (veterinarians or clinicians), 
epidemiologists, information system specialists and 
laboratory personnel, design eﬀ orts must consider each of 
these groups’ needs, capabilities, limitations, logistical 
assets, budgetary realities and legal requirements. Th e 
Integrated Disease Investigations and Surveillance (IDIS) 
tools enable planning eﬀ orts for a robust and functional 
capability backbone on which specialized tactical net works 
aimed at preparedness and rapid response can be built. 
Th e success of this approach lies in execution of a system-
wide design process that fosters communication and 
collaboration amongst the multiple stakeholders operating 
within a surveillance system, two elements that are pivotal 
for building eﬀ ective and agile coordinated national res-
ponse to local and international public health emergencies.
Methodology
As mentioned, the IDIS tools are set up to guide a design 
eﬀ ort aimed at developing a comprehensive and sustain-
able local solution for improved disease detection and 
surveillance. Th e format compels informed discussions 
across human and animal networks, bridging together 
the clinical and veterinary worlds with epidemiological, 
laboratory and program elements. Th e plans provide a 
framework and tools for multidisciplinary teams of 
experts to apply a broader “system thinking” approach 
[4,5] when working to improve existing biosurveillance 
systems. Th eir primary purpose is to provide a deliberate 
planning process that will capture system-wide critical 
information that can be later used for immediate and 
long-terms goals development (e.g. modiﬁ cations of 
testing strategy and reporting, training, strategic plan-
ning, operational research, procurement/infrastructure 
and regulatory framework, and targeted interventions).
Th e tool contains two parts: (1) a template and guid-
ance for the system-wide review of the existing bio-
surveillance environment and (2) a series of pathogen-
speciﬁ c plans, organized in syndrome clusters to reﬂ ect 
the importance of having diﬀ erential diagnostic capa-
bilities in order to rule-in or rule-out speciﬁ c diseases. 
Th e rule-in or rule-out testing strategies will be depen-
dent on the country’s existing capability, endemicity of 
the pathogen, infrastructure requirements, biosafety 
regulations and the beneﬁ t to risk ratio of adding capacity 
at various tiers of the disease surveillance networks.
Emphasis is placed on determining cross-cutting weak-
nesses or obstacles such as overall stewardship and 
manage ment issues, lack of established standards of opera-
tions, or critical resources issues (human or material), as 
these tend to often be underestimated and can lead 
otherwise well-planned interventions to failure [6]. In 
addition, it is clear that even the simplest change within 
the system may have a butterﬂ y eﬀ ect as health systems 
are dynamic, complex, and interrelated systems with the 
capacity to amplify small changes. Improved mechanisms 
for communication, enhanced understanding of the 
system interfaces and processes, and ultimately a system 
that can eﬀ ectively go through iterative processes and 
organizational improvements are the true measures of 
success.
System assessment
Because surveillance and biosecurity covers a wide range 
of technical disciplines, a diverse group of qualiﬁ ed 
international experts working with the program 
implementers may be called upon to support discussions 
during the early phase of engagement. Th e resulting 
operational assessments provide the baseline on which to 
delineate the system design. Gathering information related 
to the regulatory framework (i.e., the current standards, 
statues, and regulations that control the surveil lance 
system); the organizational components of the health 
system; the surveillance and epidemiology capacity and 
the framework for outbreak and emergency preparedness; 
workforce competency and human resources capacity at 
each tier of the health system; key research activities and 
global partnership engagement in the country or region 
prior to the planning process is essential.
CBEP and CDC use a collection of tools to evaluate and 
gather the information on existing capabilities, namely 
modiﬁ ed versions of the “National Inventory of Core 
Capabilities for Pandemic Inﬂ uenza Preparedness and 
Response” [7], the “OIE tool for the Evaluation of 
Performance of Veterinary Services” [8] and the IHR 
Monitoring Framework [9] as they provide monitoring 
and evaluation frameworks to assess improvements of 
the core capacities over time.
Th e information gathered should reach a level of 
granularity that is consistent with one’s ability to make 
informed recommendations during the design process. It 
should capture existing strategies or initiatives being 
implemented in country by the diverse health sectors, 
and outline potential conﬂ icts that could arise from the 
implementation of system-wide modiﬁ cations.
Early information-gathering visits are critical and may 
be done in parallel with workshops focused on bringing 
managers responsible for the various sectors of the health 
system together to discuss existing connectivity and 
systems approach to improving biosurveillance and 
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health outcomes. Forums should be established that 
bring together various stakeholders to work toward a 
comprehensive understanding of the existing landscape 
and reﬂ ect on where the system could and should be 
improved, and how to best coordinate and leverage 
partner ship in country. Recognized outside experts from 
these various disciplines may act as moderators of these 
discussions to shape the dialogue.
Mapping of existing detection and surveillance systems
At the national level, surveillance and detection systems 
for human and animal infectious diseases are typically 
under the responsibility of diﬀ erent departments and 
ministries. Understanding the inter-relationship between 
existing networks of these ministries and their interaction 
with the private sector is critical to mapping multi-
sectorial linkages and coordination. Th ese ﬁ ndings will 
inform the needs for broader involvement in discussions 
about system strengthening and sentinel detection, 
reinforcing the importance of linking syndromic recog-
nition, case deﬁ nitions, laboratory capacity, testing algor-
ithms, and reporting mechanisms. Th is knowledge 
should be an early product of system evaluation activities.
Mapping of the system linkages can be done in writing 
or using ﬂ ow diagrams. Th e key is to capture enough 
details to make the information relevant and usable 
during the planning process. Examples are provided 
within the tools to guide this activity.
System recommendations and design
Focused discussions with senior leadership need to 
outline the pros and cons of making changes to the 
existing system, address ﬁ nancing and governance 
implications, and identify sustainability strategies. Th ese 
discussions may require performing additional fact 
ﬁ nding and may be facilitated by the use of case scenarios 
of routine infectious disease reporting and testing, and of 
a rapid response to a suspected case or cluster of cases. A 
high level of detail is required at this stage to avoid 
creating parallel systems, unfeasible or impractical 
requirements, or unrealistic expectations. Th e outcome 
of this phase should be an agreed upon architecture of 
inter-connected networks capable of monitoring, 
detecting, assessing, and reporting events, while being 
sustained within the constraints deﬁ ned during the 
evaluation process.
Th e recommendations should go beyond detection 
capability, and require addressing the impact and value 
added of implementing changes. Larger system-wide 
issues should be addressed early on in order to improve 
the overall eﬀ ectiveness of focused interventions. 
Strength ening management, use of recognized standards 
and best practices that will guide the entire network, as 
well as focus on workforce development and strategic 
workforce planning are critical elements of the establish-
ment of sustainable systems. While planning for the 
design of a sustainable inter-related detection system, it 
is important to consider the high costs of responding to 
false alarms, while balancing the risks of delaying a case 
investigation. Finding a balance between faster, often 
less-sensitive but aﬀ ordable diagnostic tools, and more 
speciﬁ c and more complex methods is critical, as these 
decisions have a tremendous impact on the eﬀ ectiveness 
of the system.
Th e IDIS planning tools provide design guides to lead 
the team(s) through an iterative evaluation and decision 
making process. Each iteration of the process will address 
a lower level of detail within the design until the capacity 
building objectives and implementation strategies are 
clearly deﬁ ned for their program. In the early stages of 
the process, high level relationships between ministries 
and major facilities involved in the detection and 
reporting process are articulated. During follow-up 
iterations, the operations and standards that govern the 
system may be addressed, until facility level operational 
plans and standard operating procedures and policies are 
developed.
Th e pathogen-speciﬁ c templates in IDIS provide a 
framework to move from one element to the next to 
point out the inter-relationship between disciplines and 
support a consensus building environment where clinical 
or veterinary program, epidemiology and laboratory 
leader ship can understand the importance of the 
continuum of activities to improve surveillance outcomes. 
Templates have been developed for a number of patho-
gens of interest to the biosecurity community, and are 
organized to summarize the existing and desired 
capacities as follows: 1) the existing capability section 
contains the agent summary, country-adapted case 
deﬁ ni tion, local epidemiological landscape, current 
system mapping and testing strategies, standard operat-
ing procedures (SOPs), and reporting structures; 2) the 
desired capability section provides background informa-
tion on tests available for the detection of the pathogen, 
and a section that summarizes the recom mended 
changes discussed during the planning process. Th ese 
pathogen-speciﬁ c templates are designed to prompt the 
user to develop and link a complete set of activities and 
documents that are customized to the speciﬁ c local 
requirements.
Th e laboratory plays a critical role in ruling in or out 
the etiological cause of an event. Even though there are 
more and more rapid ﬁ eld tests available, their use 
remains limited to selected groups of infectious agents. 
Determining the need for referral of samples and the role 
and responsibility of the country’s laboratory network 
will vary from setting to setting and from pathogen to 
pathogen. Th e ability of the local system to absorb and 
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maintain a speciﬁ c technology or laboratory diagnostic 
test is governed by such critical variables as cost, 
logistics, human resources, and clinical/veterinary out-
comes. Laboratory capability remains essential for 
conﬁ rmation, characterization and further preventive 
actions, but may not need to be available in country [10]. 
Linkages to existing reference centers may be a better 
alternative in some settings and should not be ignored, 
nor should political and regional sensitivities. Th e 
continuing issues associated with the reporting of a false 
positive result may be a motivation for laboratory 
conﬁ rmation capability to be established in a country, but 
care needs to be given to the ability of the local system to 
produce reliable and timely data so that alerts can be 
trusted and acted upon eﬀ ectively.
Products and outcomes of IDIS planning
Th e key products and outputs from these interactions 
and the planning process include agreements on:
• Syndromic clusters for early assessment of events: Start-
ing with syndromic characteristics is helpful as it allows 
categorizing diseases by clusters, reinforces the notion 
that diﬀ erential diagnosis needs to be in place in order 
to recognize an event in a timely fashion, and reinforces 
the need for continuous clinical, veterinary and basic 
laboratory competencies of the ﬁ rst line providers.
• Case Deﬁ nitions: Th e use of standard case deﬁ nitions 
increases the speciﬁ city of reporting and improves the 
comparability of events reported from diﬀ erent geo-
graphical areas. [11] Establishment of case deﬁ nitions 
is therefore critical to the surveillance and detection 
systems, more so in the case of events of global 
importance. Th e case deﬁ nitions represent a body of 
work in itself, and if not already existing, will require 
the attention of subject matter experts working with 
country leadership to develop locally-adapted case 
deﬁ nitions on which the system can be built. Th e 
presence of laboratory and program leaders during the 
development of the case deﬁ nition is often helpful as it 
engages each group to better understand their role and 
responsibilities as well as provide critical information 
to guide the recommendations.
• Testing strategy: Th e testing strategy is the summary of 
the sequence of tests to be conducted at each tiered 
level of laboratory (local, regional, national) based on 
existing and anticipated capabilities. It represents the 
rule-in and rule-out laboratory strategies that are 
decided upon in order to conﬁ rm a case. For this 
reason, the capacities and competencies for each 
service level should be deﬁ ned in advance of the imple-
mentation of the surveillance network. Facilitating 
discussion of the limitations of each of the testing 
options by epidemiologists and laboratory managers as 
a team is critical. Th e intrinsic properties of a 
diag nostic test or a technology will inﬂ uence the 
usefulness of the data, and are often neglected topics 
of discussions that epidemiology and laboratory 
communities need to concertedly address in advance.
• Testing algorithms: Th e algorithms implemented are 
derived from testing strategies based on the 
procurement system and availability of resources. A 
testing strategy may lead to multiple testing algorithms 
depending on locally available test kits and reagents, 
and available resources.
• Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs): Decisions 
regarding testing algorithms are directly linked to 
procurement needs and standard operating proce-
dures. SOP templates have been developed for a 
majority of the techniques used in the detection of 
especially dangerous pathogens of interests to CBEP. 
Although the development of locally-owned and 
adapted SOPs represent the lowest level of detail in the 
design process, institutionally-based review and 
adaptation processes for the establishment of these 
core documents are critical to standardize procedures 
within an institution or network. Th ese documents 
provide facility speciﬁ c guidance in the execution of 
speciﬁ c tests and procedures, but retain critical pro-
cesses that allow for comparability of the data for 
appropriate decision making. Th ey are key elements in 
the establishment of a quality management system 
aimed at increasing reliability and accuracy of the data 
generated by the network.
Th ese agreed-upon elements provide the building blocks 
for the integrated implementation of a quality manage-
ment system reaching passed the institution-level to the 
surveillance system as a whole. Monitoring and 
evaluation strategies and metrics have been developed by 
the program to assess improvement of the performance 
and outcomes of the system as a whole, and are based on 
internationally recognized tools [7,8,9].
Indirect outcomes
In addition to the tangible design outputs, the overall 
planning process will inform the need for modiﬁ cations 
to the foundation of the system and build within the 
partner country new mechanisms to facilitate continuous 
improvement. Th ese outcomes typically fall under one of 
the following three categories:
• Workforce capacity and competency: Personnel with 
skills and ability to recognize unusual disease patterns 
and surveillance systems linkages among ﬁ rst line 
providers, epidemiologists and laboratory experts.
• Organizational and systems capacity: Essential infra-
structure, resources, and strategic planning, as well as 
inter-relationships, management, organizational struc-
ture, laws, policies, rules and regulations that govern 
the system.
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• Information and data system: Organized reporting and 
ﬂ ow of information.
Th ese indirect outcomes and processes can be leveraged 
by the partner to address other disease detection pro grams 
needs due to their cross-cutting nature. Mecha nisms and 
pathways for broader reforms can be under taken. Commu-
nication strategies can focus on improving vertical and 
horizontal linkages throughout the system, with the 
impacts of change in one sector being under stood and 
accounted for by the supporting sectors. A strategic 
framework for the country can then be developed around 
which international technical assis tance can be harmonized.
Conclusion
CBEP and CDC have partnered to develop methodologies 
and tools to guide the design and execution of locally-
owned capacity building activities to improve disease 
surveillance systems. Th ese tools focus on a systems 
approach to integrated disease investigations and surveil-
lance planning. Th e complexity of multiple networks and 
vertical programs within a country requires a holistic 
approach to ensuring reliability and timeliness across the 
entire health system. Often, linkages between each level 
of the health system and the processes that should ensure 
recognition and communication of a suspicious event are 
non-functioning or fall within a vertical network unable 
to react or appreciate the importance of an event.
Th e international community has long bemoaned the 
diﬃ  culties of the vertical approaches on which they often 
rely. Th e IHR(2005) [1] and the FAO-OIE-WHO colla-
bora tion [2] are refreshing strategic directions that create 
a paradigm shift and demand a holistic commitment to 
health strengthening by the global community. By 
emphasizing sound governance and leadership, quality 
systems, management competencies targeted at compre-
hensive and complex networks, workforce development 
and retention and adoption of internationally-recognized 
standards, the international community supports 
countries in developing a more robust and adaptable 
backbone on which specialized programs and disease 
speciﬁ c networks can be successfully established.
Th e lack of adequate mechanisms for linking programs 
and leveraging shared interests has often resulted in 
CBEP and CDC working at cross purposes in the past, 
competing for the attention and talents of the same 
individuals in partner country, while providing unco-
ordinated directives. Such narrowly focused eﬀ orts may 
also have failed to appreciate potential ripple eﬀ ects they 
have created across the larger system of networks, or 
recognize the limitations of larger networks to absorb the 
changes being implemented. Th is resulted in a waste of 
time and eﬀ orts, the inability of countries to leverage or 
sustain the improvements, and/or missed opportunities 
to positively aﬀ ect health outcomes.
By investing up front in thoughtful holistic design 
eﬀ orts that bring a broader stakeholder community to 
the table, the system becomes more aware of its own 
multifaceted nature and complexity, and those who strive 
to assist partner countries in continuously improving the 
outcomes of the surveillance activities can do so 
synergistically. Th e systems approach presented here, if 
done correctly, will strengthen the interfaces within and 
between networks, building core competencies and 
capabilities within the system, and focus on the 
fundamental cross-cutting elements governing the 
networks. Focusing technical assistance on supporting 
the development of comprehensive, nationwide, syste-
matic and robust core elements and processes can ensure 
speciﬁ c disease detection challenges are addressed more 
eﬀ ectively and can rely on a well-articulated and func-
tion ing architecture; an architecture that can learn and 
grow to respond adaptively to a dynamic environment in 
which new and unanticipated events can be detected and 
assessed—a capability at the heart of the IHR.
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